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a b s t r a c t
We study a pay-for-efficiency scheme that encourages hospitals to admit and discharge patients on the
same calendar daywhen clinically appropriate. Since 2010, hospitals in the English NHS are incentivised
by a higher price for patients treated as same-day discharge than for overnight stays, despite the for-
mer being less costly. We analyse administrative data for patients treated during 2006–2014 for 191
conditions for which same-day discharge is clinically appropriate – of which 32 are incentivised. Using
difference-in-difference and synthetic controlmethods, we find that the policy had generally a positive
impact with a statistically significant effect in 14 out of the 32 conditions. The median elasticity is 0.24
for planned and 0.01 for emergency conditions.Condition-specific design features explain some, but not
all, of the differential responses.
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Many healthcare systems reimburse hospitals through prospec-
tive payment systems (PPS) inwhich the price for a defined unit of
activity, such as a Diagnosis RelatedGroup (DRG), is set in advance
and is equal across hospitals ( ). Economic the-
ory predicts that hospitals will expand activity in areas where
price exceedsmarginal costs andminimise activity in areaswhere
they stand to make a loss.1 This form of reimbursement should
encourage hospitals to engage in efficient care processes and cost
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1 (Semi-)altruistic providers may be willing to treat patients for whichmarginal
costs exceed price as long as the financial losses are offset by sufficient patient
benefit. The extent to which this is possible depends on the potential for cross-
reduction strategies to improve profitmargins (
).
Oneway to reduce costs is by reducing length of stay (LoS), this
being an important cost driver. For some patients itmay be possi-
ble to reduce overnight stays to zero, specifically those for whom
care can be provided safely2 within a setting in which patients are
admitted, treated and discharged on the same day (‘same day dis-
charge’ (SDD)). Not only may an SDD be less costly to provide, it
might also be beneficial to some patients if they can recover in the
comfortof theirownhomeandare lessexposed topotentially infec-
tious hospital environments. Increasing SDDs for these patients
generates a welfare improvement driven by lower provider costs
and unaltered or improved health benefits for patients. The British
Association of Day Surgery (BADS) has recommended the
adoption of SDD for 157 types of planned surgery and the British
2 As early as 1985, the noted that “it should be clear
to all concerned, the surgeon, the nursing staff, and in particular the patient, that day-
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